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Abstract
The work presents a novel quantum secret sharing strategy based on GHZ product state sharing between three parties.
The dealer, based on the classical information to be shared, toggles his qubit and shares the product state. The other
parties make their Bell measurements and collude to reconstruct the secret. Unlike the other protocols, this protocol
does not involve the entire initial state reconstruction, rather uses selective qubits to discard the redundant qubits at
the time of reconstruction to decrypt the secret. The protocol also allows for security against malicious attacks by an
adversary without affecting the integrity of the secret. The security of the protocol lies in the fact that each party’s
correct announcement of their measurement is required for reconstruction, failing which the reconstruction process is
jeopardized, thereby ascertaining the (3, 3) scheme which can further be extended for a (n, n) scheme.
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1. Introduction
As an amalgam of classical cryptography and quantum mechanics, quantum cryptography has the potential to
achieve perfect security. The striking part about the security of this paradigm lies not in the complex mathematical
equations involved in classical cryptography, but in the quantum mechanical laws that govern them. As an improvi-
sation to traditional cryptography, secret sharing emerged as an efficient tool for secure data distribution and secret
reconstruction. Traditional algorithms by the academia were given based on the concept given in the seminal paper
[1] by Adi Shamir ’How to share a secret’ in 1979. The foundations of the quantum counterpart of the classical
version were first put by Hillery et al. in [2]. The work forms the basis of most quantum secret sharing algorithm
currently devised. The work was further studied for the entanglement properties and measurement basis directions to
be incorporated in the works by Karlsson et al. in [3]. The scheme went one step further to explain the concept of
eavesdropping detection and mitigation. The scheme proposed by Xiao et al. in [4] was a generalization of Hillery’s
scheme into arbitrary multi parties. Zhang et al. in [5] used a single particle for multiparty secret sharing using differ-
ent single-qubit gates and x and z direction basis. Guo & Guo, in their work presented in [6], implemented quantum
secret sharing without entanglement and claimed 100% theoretical security. Focussing on more practical aspects,
Tittel et al. in [7] demonstrated the concept of quantum secret sharing experimentally. Zhang et al. in [5] and Li et
al. in [8] harnessed the feature of qubit swapping and product states formed by Bell state to devise a novel secret
sharing algorithm. Rong et al. gave a novel idea in [9] that proposed secret sharing with the aid of quantum error-
correcting codes. To prevent any noise interruption during the communication of particles during secret sharing, many
fault-tolerant schemes were proposed as in [10, 11] that were based on Decoherence-free subspace. There is another
paradigm that deals with classical and quantum secret sharing working in tandem. These schemes rely on three phases;
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the first phase relies on using classical cryptographic techniques like Lagrange’s interpolation over finite fields, Chi-
nese remainder theorem on the secret for creating the shares. The second phase involves implementing the generalized
Pauli operators on the individual qubits for particle distribution and doing a Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT) on
individual qubits. The algorithms implementing this techniques include [12–16]. In recent times, experimental work
has picked up momentum, and works like [17, 18] have been reported that involved polarization-entangled state and
multipartite bound entanglement.
The proposed work is based on the quantum mechanical properties of entanglement and the measurement of
particles in the right Bell basis. Four fundamental single qubit gates are used for the transmission of the classical
secret : I = |0〉 〈0| + |1〉 〈1|, that does nothing on the quantum state, X = |0〉 〈1| + |1〉 〈0|, that acts as a NOT gate and
flips the qubit that is acted upon, Y = i |1〉 〈0| − i |0〉 〈1| acts as rotation about the Y axis by pi on the Bloch sphere,
Z = |0〉 〈0| − |1〉 〈1| which acts as a rotation about the Z axis by pi.
2. Protocol
The protocol consists of 4 participants: the dealer D and three reconstructors P1, P2, P3. The dealer generates and
shares at random a product state from the following:
|A〉 =
( |000〉123 + |111〉123√
2
) ( |000〉456 + |111〉456√
2
)
|B〉 =
( |001〉123 + |110〉123√
2
) ( |001〉456 + |110〉456√
2
)
|C〉 =
( |011〉123 + |100〉123√
2
) ( |011〉456 + |100〉456√
2
)
|D〉 =
( |101〉123 + |010〉123√
2
) ( |101〉456 + |010〉456√
2
)
(1)
The indexing of the qubits denote the particles in possession of players, i.e P1 has 1 and 6, P2 has 2 and 5, P3 has 3
and 4. D chooses to operate single qubit gates I,X, iY,Z on the qubits to share the classical secret in the following
manner :
I1 = ‘00
′, I6 = ‘11′
X1 = ‘01
′,X6 = ‘10′
iY1 = ‘11
′, iY6 = ‘00′
Z1 = ‘10
′,Z6 = ‘01′
for ex: Z1 and Z6 denotes a Z gate on qubit 1 and 6 respectively. The secret sharing involves the following steps:
1. D randomly chooses to operate on qubit 1st or 6th and reserves this announcement until the other parties ask
him.
2. P1 makes Bell basis measurement on his qubits pair (1, 6) and reserves his measurement results till further
notice.
3. P2 and P3 also make respective Bell measurements on their qubits and do not disclose their results.
4. The reconstruction involves each part to give in their measurement results starting with D’s information about
the state created and the qubit toggled.
3. Example
Step 1. Suppose D creates the product state out of GHZ states [19],
|A〉 =
( |000〉123 + |111〉123√
2
) ( |000〉456 + |111〉456√
2
)
2
Step 2. D operates a iY gate on qubit 1 and shares the qubits to the three participants.
Step 3. P1 measures say |β+〉16, this collapses the system into the states(
−
∣∣∣α+〉
23
∣∣∣α−〉
45
−
∣∣∣α−〉
23
∣∣∣α+〉
45
)
(2)
The set of all possible measurements outcomes are given in Table below
D’s
Operation
→
P1’s
Outcome
Collapsed State
I1
|α+〉16
1
2
(|α+〉23 |α+〉45 + |α−〉23 |α−〉45)
|α−〉16
1
2
(|α+〉23 |α−〉45 + |α−〉23 |α+〉45)
|β+〉16
1
2
(|β+〉23 |β+〉45 + |β−〉23 |β−〉45)
|β−〉16
1
2
(|β+〉23 |β−〉45 + |β−〉23 |β+〉45)
X1
|α+〉16
1
2
(|β+〉23 |β+〉45 + |β−〉23 |β−〉45)
|α−〉16
1
2
(− |β+〉23 |β−〉45 − |β−〉23 |β+〉45)
|β+〉16
1
2
(|α+〉23 |α+〉45 + |α−〉23 |α−〉45)
|β−〉16
1
2
(|−α+〉23 |α−〉45 − |α−〉23 |α+〉45)
iY1
|α+〉16
1
2
(− |β+〉23 |β−〉45 − |β−〉23 |β+〉45)
|α−〉16
1
2
(|β+〉23 |β+〉45 + |β−〉23 |β−〉45)
|β+〉16
1
2
(− |α+〉23 |α−〉45 − |α−〉23 |α+〉45)
|β−〉16
1
2
(|α+〉23 |α+〉45 + |α−〉23 |α−〉45)
Z1
|α+〉16
1
2
(|α+〉23 |α−〉45 + |α−〉25 |α+〉45)
|α−〉16
1
2
(|α+〉25 |α+〉45 + |α−〉25 |α−〉45)
|β+〉16
1
2
(|β+〉25 |β−〉45 + |β−〉25 |β+〉45)
|β−〉16
1
2
(|β+〉25 |β+〉45 + |β−〉25 |β−〉45)
Table 1: Unitary operation and Corresponding Measurement Results
Step 4. For the reconstruction of the secret, P2 and P3 divulge in their measurement results say |α−〉25 and |α+〉34. The
state produced by their measurements( without the normalizing factor) is
|a〉 = (|0〉2 |0〉5 − |1〉2 |1〉5) (|0〉3 |0〉4 + |1〉3 |1〉4)
= |0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5 + |0〉2 |1〉3 |1〉4 |0〉5 − |1〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 |1〉5 − |1〉2 |1〉3 |1〉4 |1〉5
(3)
Step 5. Participants P2 and P3 ask D for the state initially prepared. D tells that it created the first or second state from
eq.(1), they keep the first and fourth term of the above equation else they keep the second and third term. Say
D created the first state so the state left after discarding the terms is :
|0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5 − |1〉2 |1〉3 |1〉4 |1〉5 (4)
3
Step 6. P1 divulges its share say |β+〉16 to get the state as:
|b〉 = (|0〉1 |1〉6 + |1〉1 |0〉6)(|0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5 − |1〉2 |1〉3 |1〉4 |1〉5)
= |0〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5 |1〉6 − |0〉1 |1〉2 |1〉3 |1〉4 |1〉5 |1〉6 + |1〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5 |0〉6 − |1〉1 |1〉2 |1〉3 |1〉4 |1〉5 |0〉6
(5)
Step 7. D confirms which state it generated and which qubit it changed. If D says for instance it created the first state
from eq.(1) and it toggled the first qubit, then they know that qubit 4, 5, 6 should be in state |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 or |1〉 |1〉 |1〉,
so they discard the first and fourth term from the above eq.(5) and get
|c〉 = |1〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5 |0〉6 − |0〉1 |1〉2 |1〉3 |1〉4 |1〉5 |1〉6 (6)
Step 8. Inferring the fact that the terms represent the two terms with perfect correlation between the qubits of the first
product state from eq. (1), they conclude that the operation done is iY, since
iY1(|0〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5 |0〉6+|1〉1 |1〉2 |1〉3 |1〉4 |1〉5 |1〉6) = |c〉 = |1〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5 |0〉6−|0〉1 |1〉2 |1〉3 |1〉4 |1〉5 |1〉6
(7)
Step 9. Thus, the parties, by the information ushered by the participants and discarding strategy of qubits reconstruct
the secret operator and hence the secret message i.e ‘11’, without reconstructing the initial state.
4. Security Analysis
The security analysis of the protocol is based on the information that is not made public by D and other participants.
4.1. D hides the state being shared
Suppose D created the state |C〉 and applied an X1 gate, then P1’s measurement of say |α+〉16 will collapse the
system into the state
1
2
(|α+〉23 |α+〉45 − |α−〉23 |α−〉45), which can be seen in a row corresponding to every operator
(apart from the phase of the state) in Table 1. If D announces incorrectly that he created the state |A〉, then parties
collude to deduce the secret as I1 instead of the real secret X1, i.e. ‘01’. The same is the case when the state is |B〉 and
|D〉. So in this scenario, the secret will never be revealed, and hence the participation of D is necessary.
4.2. D lies about the qubit acted upon
D has the discretion to choose between the qubits. Suppose D announces correctly the state it prepared but lies
about the qubit. For instance if D toggled the 1st qubit, but announces the 6th qubit, then according to Step 6 of the
preceding example, the parties know that qubits 1, 2, 3 would be in states |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 or |1〉 |1〉 |1〉 and hence they agree
on state
|b〉 = |0〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5 |1〉6 − |1〉1 |1〉2 |1〉3 |1〉4 |1〉5 |0〉6 (8)
. Deciphering on the same grounds of Step 8, they conclude that the operation was actual iY6. Though they guess
the operator correctly, the qubit operated upon makes them their final conclusion of the classical secret ‘00’ wrong.
So, the protocol is robust in the sense that the position of the qubit acted upon and D’s correct announcement is
fundamental to the correct message to b communicated.
4.3. P1 hides about his measurement results
The announcement of P’s measurement outcome is crucial in the reconstruction of the secret. This is ascertained
by the following two cases (i) P1 does not give information about the measurement, the consequences are obvious
from Table 1. For instance, every collapsed state in the third column corresponds to every measurement outcome of
P1 and therefore to every operator either I1,X1, iY1,Z1, for instance
I1 ⇔
∣∣∣α−〉
16
(∣∣∣α+〉
23
∣∣∣α−〉
45
+
∣∣∣α−〉
23
∣∣∣α+〉
45
)
X1 ⇔
∣∣∣β−〉
16
(∣∣∣α+〉
23
∣∣∣α−〉
45
+
∣∣∣α−〉
23
∣∣∣α+〉
45
)
iY1 ⇔
∣∣∣β+〉
16
(∣∣∣α+〉
23
∣∣∣α−〉
45
+
∣∣∣α−〉
23
∣∣∣α+〉
45
)
Z1 ⇔
∣∣∣α+〉
16
(∣∣∣α+〉
23
∣∣∣α−〉
45
+
∣∣∣α−〉
23
∣∣∣α+〉
45
)
4
4.4. P3 does not collude
Collusion of P2 and P3 is necessary for the reconstruction of the fact. Consider Step 2 of the previous section.
The simplified form of eq.(2) is
|χ〉 =
(∣∣∣α+〉
25
∣∣∣α−〉
34
+
∣∣∣α−〉
25
∣∣∣α+〉
34
)
(9)
If D had operated with the I1 gate, then the simplified equation would have been
|χ〉 =
(∣∣∣α+〉
25
∣∣∣α+〉
34
+
∣∣∣α+〉
25
∣∣∣α+〉
34
)
(10)
If P3 refrains from sharing his announcement result, then for either measurement result |α+〉25 or |α−〉25 P3 will be in
a dilemma whether P3 got a |α+〉34 or |α−〉34 which would lead him to incorrectly decrypt the operator as iY1 or X.
Hence, alone P2 cannot reconstruct the secret.
4.5. Adversary Eve’s attack on the state
An adversary may intend to disrupt the secret reconstruction by altering the state prepared. For instance if D
prepares the state |A〉, operates a Z1 gate and shares the state. Eve intercepts the transmission and modifies the 6th
qubit with an arbitrary gate say X6, so the modified state looks like
∣∣∣A˜〉 =
( |000〉123 − |111〉123√
2
) ( |001〉456 + |110〉456√
2
)
(11)
P1 measures his particles for the state say |α+〉16 which collapses the system into∣∣∣β+〉
25
∣∣∣β−〉
34
+
∣∣∣β−〉
25
∣∣∣β+〉
34
P2 and P3 measure |β−〉25 and |β+〉34 to obtain
|0〉2 |0〉3 |1〉4 |1〉5 + |0〉2 |1〉3 |0〉4 |1〉5 − |1〉2 |0〉3 |1〉4 |0〉5 − |1〉2 |1〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5
They implement the discarding strategy to keep the first and fourth term
|0〉2 |0〉3 |1〉4 |1〉5 − |1〉2 |1〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5
They ask for P1’s measurement of |α+〉16 to get
|0〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |1〉4 |1〉5 |0〉6 − |0〉1 |1〉2 |1〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5 |0〉6 + |1〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |1〉4 |1〉5 |1〉6 − |1〉1 |1〉2 |1〉3 |0〉4 |0〉5 |1〉6
Now, they ask D about the state he prepared and the qubit he transformed, which he obliges to. Using this knowledge
of the positioning of qubits and the logic used in Step 7, they keep the second and third term from the above equation
and deduce the operation iY1. Since they have the state with them, P2 and P3 also get to know from the discarded
terms, the operator Eve used on its qubit i.e X1. One important aspect of reconstructing the secret is the correct
announcement of D of the qubit it transformed. If D said it transformed the 6th qubit, then P2 and P3 would have kept
the first and fourth terms to deduce the operator as X6.
5. Conclusion
The proposed protocol utilizes the entangled GHZ state for secret sharing between three parties and the dealer.
The participation of each party with his share is mandatory for reconstruction, as has been shown in the security
analysis. Any eves-dropping on a particular state is identified and is discarded, to arrive at the real secret. The
judicious discarding strategy by the players eliminates the spurious cases and facilitates in the secret reconstruction
without reconstructing the entire original state. The other key feature of the algorithm lies in the communication of
the classical message based on the qubit positioning, which adds an extra level of security since the same operator
encodes two different messages based on the qubit it acted upon. The current scheme has scope for the generalized
(n, n) secret sharing techniques for transmitting classical information in areas of quantum image processing and many
more.
5
References
[1] Adi Shamir. How to share a secret. Communications of the ACM, 22(11):612–613, 1979.
[2] Mark Hillery, Vladimı´r Buzˇek, and Andre´ Berthiaume. Quantum secret sharing. Physical Review A, 59(3):1829, 1999.
[3] Anders Karlsson, Masato Koashi, and Nobuyuki Imoto. Quantum entanglement for secret sharing and secret splitting. Physical Review A,
59(1):162, 1999.
[4] Li Xiao, Gui Lu Long, Fu-Guo Deng, and Jian-Wei Pan. Efficient multiparty quantum-secret-sharing schemes. Physical Review A,
69(5):052307, 2004.
[5] Zhan-jun Zhang, Yong Li, and Zhong-xiao Man. Multiparty quantum secret sharing. Physical Review A, 71(4):044301, 2005.
[6] Guo-Ping Guo and Guang-Can Guo. Quantum secret sharing without entanglement. Physics Letters A, 310(4):247–251, 2003.
[7] Wolfgang Tittel, Hugo Zbinden, and Nicolas Gisin. Experimental demonstration of quantum secret sharing. Physical Review A, 63(4):042301,
2001.
[8] Yongmin Li, Kuanshou Zhang, and Kunchi Peng. Multiparty secret sharing of quantum information based on entanglement swapping. Physics
Letters A, 324(5-6):420–424, 2004.
[9] Zhang Zu-Rong, Liu Wei-Tao, and Li Cheng-Zu. Quantum secret sharing based on quantum error-correcting codes. Chinese Physics B,
20(5):050309, 2011.
[10] Bin Gu, Lili Mu, Liuguan Ding, Chengyi Zhang, and Chuanqi Li. Fault tolerant three-party quantum secret sharing against collective noise.
Optics Communications, 283(15):3099–3103, 2010.
[11] Yu-Guang Yang, Yi-Wei Teng, Hai-Ping Chai, and Qiao-Yan Wen. Fault-tolerant quantum secret sharing against collective noise. Physica
Scripta, 83(2):025003, 2011.
[12] Huawang Qin and Yuewei Dai. Verifiable (t, n) threshold quantum secret sharing using d-dimensional bell state. Information Processing
Letters, 116(5):351–355, 2016.
[13] Huawang Qin, Raylin Tso, and Yuewei Dai. Multi-dimensional quantum state sharing based on quantum fourier transform. Quantum
Information Processing, 17(3):48, 2018.
[14] Heling Xiao and Jingliang Gao. Multi-party d-level quantum secret sharing scheme. International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 52(6):2075–
2082, 2013.
[15] Wei Yang, Liusheng Huang, Runhua Shi, and Libao He. Secret sharing based on quantum fourier transform. Quantum information processing,
12(7):2465–2474, 2013.
[16] Samaneh Mashhadi. General secret sharing based on quantum fourier transform. Quantum Information Processing, 18(4):114, 2019.
[17] Brian P Williams, Joseph M Lukens, Nicholas A Peters, Bing Qi, and Warren P Grice. Quantum secret sharing with polarization-entangled
photon pairs. Physical Review A, 99(6):062311, 2019.
[18] Yaoyao Zhou, Juan Yu, Zhihui Yan, Xiaojun Jia, Jing Zhang, Changde Xie, and Kunchi Peng. Quantum secret sharing among four players
using multipartite bound entanglement of an optical field. Physical review letters, 121(15):150502, 2018.
[19] Daniel M Greenberger, Michael A Horne, and Anton Zeilinger. Bells theorem, quantum theory, and conceptions of the universe, 1989.
6
